1) Man is prone to sin by nature.

2) Man, who has free will, is responsible for his actions and, as such, may be subject to punishment for his transgressions.

3) Man has the capacity for improvement and the opportunity for Teshuvah, repentance.

An important focus of these chapters and of the commentaries is on the aftermath of sin – the human reactions and their implications for the future. Does man have the propensity for repentence, or is his tendency to rationalize and flee from responsibility?

The First Sin – Who Is Responsible?

The transgression of Adam and Chava in the Garden of Eden involved eating a fruit that was specifically forbidden by God. Although Adam and Chava both transgressed intentionally and knowingly, it was clearly the snake who initiated the sin.

"והנחש היה ערום מכל חית השדה אשר עשה ה' א-לקים ויאמר אל האשה: אף כי אמר א-לקים לא תאכלו מכל עץ הגן. ותאמר האשה אל הנחש: מפרי עץ הגן נאכל. ומפרי העץ אשר בתוך הגן אמר א-לקים לא תאכלו ממנו ולא תגעו בו פן תמתון. ויאמר הנחש אל האשה: לא מות תמתון. כי ידע א-לקים כי ביום אכלכם ממנו ונפקחו עיניכם והייתם כא-לקים ידעי טוב ורע." (בראשית ג:א-ה)

“And the snake was craftier than all of the beasts of the field that the Lord had made. And he said to the woman: ‘Has God said that you may not eat of any tree of the Garden?’ And the woman said to the serpent: ‘We may eat of the fruit of the trees of the garden, but of the fruit of the tree that is in the midst of the garden, God has said that you shall not eat of it neither shall you touch it, lest you die.’ And the serpent said to the woman: ‘You shall certainly not die, for God knows that on the day that you eat of it, your eyes shall be opened and you shall be like gods, knowing good and evil.” (Bereshit 3:1-5)

This scenario contains insights into the psychology of sin. Although Adam and Chava had a beautiful world at their disposal, the snake succeeded in getting Chava to feel sorry for herself about the one thing that was forbidden to her. The extent of the prohibition itself becomes exaggerated in her mind, encompassing not only the eating of the fruit, but also touching it as well. At the same time, the severity of the prohibition is downgraded in her mind as she transforms what was a divine command (Bereshit 2:16-17) into an arbitrary statement (“God has said”). The snake adds the suspicion that God’s motives are personal by introducing the element of competition. Furthermore, the transgressor does not like to act alone, but rather seeks a partner in crime. Chava was thus tempted to eat of the forbidden fruit and to give some to her husband.

Similar psychological processes can prevent the perpetrators from taking responsibility for their transgression when challenged. Following this sin, God confronted all three of the participants in the transgression:

"ויאמר: מי הגיד לך כי עירם אתה המן העץ אשר צויתיך לבלתי אכול ממנו אכלת." (בראשית ג:יא)

“And He (God) said (to Adam): ‘Who told you that you were naked?

Have you eaten of the tree of which I commanded you that you should not eat?’” (Bereshit 3:11)

"ויאמר ה' א-לקים לאשה: מה זאת עשית." (בראשית ג:יג)

“And the Lord God said to the woman: ‘What is this that you have done?’” (Bereshit 3:13)

"ויאמר ה' א-לקים לנחש: כי עשית זאת ארור אתה מכל הבהמות ומכל הית השדה…" (בראשית ג:יד)

“And the Lord God said to the serpent: ‘Because you have done this you are cursed above all cattle and above every beast of the field….’” (Bereshit 3:14)

The lack of parallelism between these three confrontations is evident. While God questions Adam and Chava, giving them an opportunity to explain their actions, He confronts the snake with an accusatory declaration. Rashi explains:

כי עשית זאת: מכאן שאין מהפכים בזכויות של מסית …"

“Because you have done this: From here we infer that we should not seek arguments in favor of a seducer (“mesit”)…”

The seducer is not given the opportunity to respond for he might claim that he was misunderstood, that he never intended for the person to actually perform the act. Clearly in our case, the culpability of the snake as a seducer is assumed. But what of the culpability of Adam and Chava? Apparently, both try to reduce their own responsibility for the transgression by projecting it to someone else. Adam tries to place primary responsibility on Chava:

"האשה אשר נתת עמדי הוא נתנה לי מן העץ ואכל." (בראשית ג:יב)

“The woman whom you gave to be with me, she gave me of the tree and I did eat.” (Bereshit 3:12)

Some commentators infer from the repetition of the use of the verb “to give” in this verse that Adam even placed some of the blame on God:

"ורבותינו קורין אותו בזה כפוי טובה, ירצו לפרש שענה אותו אתה גרמת לי המכשול הזה שנתת לי אשה לעזור והיא יעצתני להרשיע." (רמב"ן בראשית ג:יב)

“Hence our sages (Avodah Zarah 5b) called him (Adam) ungrateful, because he blamed his transgression on God for giving him a woman as a help, but who with her advice caused him to sin.” (Ramban on Bereshit 3:12)

According to Ramban’s own opinion, Adam was not blaming God, but was simply explaining why he was led to sin.

האשה אשר אתה בכבודך נתת אותה לי לעזר, היא נתנה לי מן העץ, והייתי חושב שכל אשר תאמר אלי יהיה לי לעזר ולהועיל."

“The woman who you graciously gave to be my help, she gave me from the tree. I thought that anything that she would say to me would be to help me.” (Ramban, Bereshit 3:12)

This commentary suggests that Adam was trying to explain and justify his confusion that led to his participation in the sin. The wording of God’s response to Adam, however, makes it clear that Chava’s role in the sin and its impact on Adam in no way lessens his level of responsibility:

"ולאדם אמר: כי שמעת לקול אשתך ותאכל מן העץ אשר צויתיך לאמר לא תאכל ממנו ארורה האדמה בעבורך בעצבון תאכלנה כל ימי חייך." (בראשית ג:יז)

“And to Adam He said: ‘Because you listened to the voice of your wife and ate from the tree that I commanded you saying that you should not eat from it, cursed is the ground for your sake, in sorrow shall you eat from it all the days of your life…’” (Bereshit 3:17)

In her response, Chava also tries to reduce her level of responsibility by laying blame on the snake.

"ותאמר האשה: הנחש השיאני ואכל." (בראשית ג:יג)

“And the woman said: ‘The snake beguiled me (“hishiani”), and I ate.’” (Bereshit 3:13)

As we saw earlier, the snake indeed was held responsible by God for his seduction of Chava. Interestingly, Chava did not use the term “seduced” (“hesit”) in her defense, but rather “hishiani”, a term that indicates confusion. Both Mizrachi and Gur Aryeh, supercommentaries on Rashi, explain that Chava did not use the term “seduce” because it would not constitute a valid response to God’s question. As Gur Aryeh expressed it: “The sinner’s answer when asked why he sinned, ‘So-and-So led me astray’, would be unacceptable.” Thus, we see from the responses of Adam and Chava that the Torah categorically denies the lessening of individual responsibility because of confusion or because the act was suggested or justified by someone else.

This principle is also found in Jewish law with regard to the laws of agency (“shlichut”). Although in legal matters, the actions of a person’s agent are attributed to the one who appointed him, the halacha posits that there is no agency in the event of a transgression (“ein shliach ledvar aveirah”). According to this doctrine, the actual perpetrator of the transgression always bears responsibility. The gemara (Kiddushin 42b) explains that this concept is based on the following principle: “The words of the teacher and the words of the student – whose words should one obey?” If we are told to do something by an authority figure and urged to do the opposite by someone who is also his subordinate, we must clearly follow the directive of the one who has authority over both of us. The analogy in the gemara refers, of course, to a case in which an individual asks another person to do something that is against the laws of the Torah. If the person accedes to the request, he is held responsible and cannot project the culpability to the one who asked him to perform the act. He should have realized that they are both subject to God’s command.

It is this principle that is at work in our narrative. The attempts of Adam and Chava to project the responsibility for their indiscretions to others is unsuccessful. Each is held responsible for his/her role in the transgression and punished accordingly.

The First Murder – Does Cayin Repent?

Chapter 4 of Bereshit, dealing with Cayin’s murder of Hevel, focuses on the concept of Teshuvah, repentance. Even before he committed the murder of his brother, Cayin was taught of the possibility of repentance:

"ויאמר ה' אל קין: למה חרה לך ולמה נפלו פניך: הלוא אם תיטיב שאת ואם לא תיטיב לפתח חטאת רובץ." (בראשית ד:ו-ז)

“And God said to Cayin: ‘Why are you angry and why are you crestfallen? If you improve, will you not be forgiven? But if you do not improve, sin crouches at the door…’” (Bereshit 4:6-7)

This principle is absent in the previous story. Presumably, the rationalizations of Adam and Chava prevented them from engaging in the process of repentence. But, Cayin does not engage in rationalization or projection. After his initial denial, Cayin seems to accept responsibility for his actions. Nevertheless, the commentators are divided regarding Cayin’s degree of remorse. The controversy focuses on verses 4:13-14:

ויאמר קין אל ה' גדול עוני מנשוא: הן גרשת אותי היום מעל פני האדמה ומפניך אסתר והייתי נע ונד בארץ והיה כל מוצאי יהרגני.

And Cayin said to God: “My sin is too great to bear (“gadol avoni minso”). Behold, you have driven me out this day from the face of the earth, and from your face shall I be hidden, and I shall be a fugitive and a vagabond on the earth, and it shall come to pass that anyone who finds me will slay me.”

The exegesis on this section focuses on the apparent incongruity between the two verses. If we see the first statement as a confession of guilt, then the second statement in which Cayin seems to complain about the punishment seems contradictory. Ramban attempts to reconcile the two verses as follows:

אמר, אמת כי עוני גדול מלסלוח וצדיק אתה ה' וישר משפטיך אף על פי שנענשת אותי הרבה מאד…. אבל מה אעשה כי כל מוצאי יהרגני ואתה בחסדך הרבים לא חייבת אותי מיתה.

He (Cayin) said: “It is correct that my sin is too great to be forgiven, and you God are righteous and your judgements are just, even though you punished me very severely…. But what can I do? – For anyone who finds me will kill me; and you in your great kindness did not sentence me to death.”

Ramban views Cayin as a sincere penitent who accepts the punishment that God has given him. He is appreciative of the fact that God sentenced him to exile and not to death. This is the basis of his challenge in verse 14 – that although God did not intend it, the exile itself would result in a death sentence. This explanation is consistent, as well, with the subsequent verse in which God takes steps to protect Cayin and threatens a severe punishment for anyone who will harm him.

Rashi interprets these verses in a much different manner. He considers verse 13 to be a question: “Is my sin too great to forgive?” Rashi views Cayin as one who admits his guilt, but does not see the gravity of his transgression. He is prepared to accept a punishment, but feels that the punishment which God has determined is too severe. By making a slight change in punctuation, Rashi reconciles verse 13 to the simple understanding of verse 14. Rashi’s portrayal of Cayin is also consistent with his previous behavior, which was characterized by anger, frustration, and confrontation. In other words, Rashi does not see the justification for Ramban’s portrayal of Cayin as a complete penitent. Rashi maintains his approach throughout, interpreting verse 15 to be an indication that Cayin, whose penitence is insufficient, will be avenged for the death of Hevel after seven generations – that his just punishment will be deferred, not cancelled. Similarly, he interprets Cayin’s departure from God in verse 16 in a negative light: “He left submissively, as one who tricked the Almighty.”

Sforno offers an interpretation in between the explanation of Rashi and that of Ramban:

אחר שראה שהא-ל יתברך משגיח בפרטים בהחלט, חשב שידע בלי ספק שאינו שב מחטאו בהיותו מתחרט אלא מפני העונש, וזה אחרי ההפצר שהעיר בו הא-ל יתברך לשוב בתשובה והוא מרה. ובזה אמר שלא היתה לחטאו תקות תשובה מכפרת ומגינה על העונש שנענש עתה.

Once he realized that God certainly oversees the details, he reasoned that He (God) knew without a doubt that he was not repenting out of remorse, but because of the punishment. And this was after he had defied God’s previous urging to repent. He, therefore, concluded that he had no hope of repenting and receiving atonement for the punishment that was already determined.

Sforno portrays Cayin as one who does penitence out of fear of punishment (“Teshuva m’yirah”). He has reconciled himself to the punishment, but is not completely remorseful. By connecting Cayin’s response to his previous rejection of the process of repentence, Sforno preserves the consistency of his character throughout the narrative. Sforno interprets verse 14 in the same way as the Ramban, that the possibility that he will be killed in exile makes the punishment greater than God had decreed.

Thus, we see among the commentators, three different levels of Teshuvah reflected in Cayin:

1) According to Rashi, Cayin recognizes his responsibility for the act of murder, but he is not truly a penitent because he does not realize its severity. As such, his guilt remains.

2) According to Sforno, Cayin is a penitent out of fear (“m’yirah”) who has not had complete remorse for his actions. This type of penitence has some impact with regard to the removal of guilt and a reduction of the punishment.

3) According to Ramban, Cayin is a complete penitent (“gemura”). Although he still receives a partial punishment, he has had complete remorse and has returned to God’s good graces.

Conclusion

מצאו אדם הראשון ואמר לו: "מה נעשה בדינך ?" אמר לו קין: "עשיתי תשובה והשי"ת הקל מעלי ענשי." אז טפח אדם הראשון טפיחות בעצמו ואמר: "וכל כך גדול כוחה של תשובה ואני לא ידעתי." (ילקוט מעם לועז בראשית ד:טז)

Adam, the first man, came across him (Cayin) and said; “What was the outcome of your judgement?” Cayin replied: “I repented and God reduced my punishment.” Then Adam slapped himself and said: “So great is the power of repentance, and I didn’t know.” (Yalkut Meam Loez, Bereshit 4:16)

Cayin indeed has something to teach Adam about the process of Teshuvah. Through the juxtaposition of these two narratives, we gain psychological insight into the various levels of repentance, and the impediments presented by trivializing, rationalization, and projection.